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AS JUSTICE AND PRUDENCE DICTATE: THE
MORALITY OF AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM - A RESPONSE TO JAMES V. SCHALL, S.J.
William Joseph Wagner'
In his essay, "On the Justice and Prudence of this War," James V.
Schall, S.J. fashions a moral defense of the current American military
action against international terrorism, in the terms supplied by
traditional just war reasoning. In undertaking the task, he understands
himself to be offering philosophical support for the judgments in
prudence that a nation and its representatives must make about political
action. He stipulates that his defense of the war does not guarantee
either that history will judge the United States to have been in the right,
or that the unfolding of events will reward the United States' action with
practical success. He asserts only that knowledge of its morally
justifiable character will "avoid putting a nation in moral conflict with
itself" as it seeks to defend itself. His argument aims at ensuring
integrity in moral reasoning and decision, which, in turn, will tend to
increase the freedom of the nation to act well in the current crisis.
This response to Father Schall's article explores just how three
principles, which he proposes in general terms as central to integrity in
moral reasoning and decision over the use of military force, serve, in fact,
to organize an assessment of the rights and wrongs of actions by states
and individuals within a conflict like the one coming to a crisis on
September 11th. In the course of its analysis, the article means to show
that prudence has a role, not only once the requirements of justice are
satisfied, as a too casual reading of Father Schall's article might perhaps
imply, but rather, in keeping with the larger import of Father Schall's
argument, at the moment of first evaluating facts as in or out of accord
with distinctions arising under the principles of justice he elaborates. In
particular, the article calls attention to ontological assumptions
underlying such threshold judgments of prudence. It then concludes by
arguing that the dependence of prudential judgment on these
assumptions means that America's war effort cannot be justified in a
simply static sense, but, rather, that it may licitly be pursued only as a
part of a larger plan of commitment, also undertaken as a matter of law
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and politics, to preserve the ontological conditions essential to the
nation's integrity as it resorts to arms.
I. MORAL INTEGRITY IN THE RESORT TO MILITARY FORCE DEPENDS
ON THREE BASIC PRINCIPLES
In the course of his article, Father Schall cites a total of ten criteria
traditionally used in "just war" reasoning: seven to determine jus ad
bellum, and three to determine jus in bello. In order to isolate the
central or pivotal principles relating to moral obligation or justice, one
can begin by setting aside two of these criteria which are purely
prudential, probability of success and last resort. One may also eliminate
purely procedural principles, right intention and comparative justice. One
may also reduce them from two to one, where discrimination may be
considered as a corollary of proportionality. The consolidation of the
principles covering both jus ad bellum and jus in bello into a single list
then results in a statement of three principles: (1) just cause; (2) public
authority; and (3) proportionality of response.
At first glance, international conflict appears in its material and
subjective dimensions, as the two sides' reciprocal experience of harm, as
a violation of their subjective senses of what is acceptable. Thus
considered, the resolution of disputes would have to occur either by one
side simply overpowering the other, or, at best, by pragmatic mutual
compromise. Father Schall suggests, however, that a rule of reason can
be brought to bear in the resolution of such disputes whether the parties
can manage this amicably or do so by morally sanctioned force of arms.
The three principles mentioned above comprise an important part of that
rule of reason. Yet the judgment of right which each principle permits is
not automatic. It hinges on certain morally cogent distinctions and the
capacity to apply these distinctions to the facts of the situation. Since his
focus is on the broader sweep of philosophical argument, Father Schall
does not develop this aspect of the case in particular detail. But, in doing
so one gains most in clarity regarding why some claims made by America
and its terrorist opponents, respectively, are rightly affirmed and others
set aside as against reason. The gain is, at once, one of understanding
our opponents even as we affirm our right to redress against them and of
properly discerning the conditional nature of that affirmation.
A. Just Cause
Many causes of grievance exist in international relations, but only
some justify military redress. The latter such grievances are based on
redressable wrongs. The principle of just cause, as Father Schall develops
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it, thus distinguishes between wrongs that are redressable and those
which are not. The distinction turns on the blameworthiness of the
perpetrator's will, in the terms of criminal law, his or her mens rea.1 In
this context, mens rea arises through some act or omission of the will
yielding some material harm, which identifiable human beings suffer
involuntarily, without any sufficient justification deriving from their guilt.
The justice of America's cause in its war against terrorism flows from its
ability to show that it is acting to redress such wrongs, where its
opponents are not able to do so. The inability or unwillingness of
America's opponents to reason in accord with this distinction is at the
heart of their fanaticism and it intensifies the moral necessity of military
redress against them.
The terrorists can recite many harms to the people they claim to
represent. Some such harms are material, as in the case of economic
losses caused by America's pursuit of its commercial interests. Others
are less tangible, but still empirically demonstrable, such as the erosion of
cultural assets through a kind of imperialism of American business
practices and the penetration of its media. Nearly all the harms they
allege imply moral failing on America's part, if only through its pervasive
amoral preference for wealth and convenience, over higher cultural and
spiritual values.2
Some of the more intangible harms alleged imply something akin to a
true depravity of aspects of American culture. Those with a spiritual
sensitivity somewhat less than that of the biblical prophets, in watching
the transmission of Saturday Night Live following Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani's guest appearance on that show3 to reinforce American self-
esteem and patriotism, may perhaps, nonetheless, have been stirred to
realize, if only dimly, that they were viewing material reflecting a
mentality which was low, if there is such a thing as low, and morally
insolent, if moral insolence exists, and inclined, in fact, to moral
corruption and to spiritual perdition, especially of children, if such things
exist. Some, who are prone to cast the current conflict as one between
Islam and the heirs of Christendom, seem to derive consolation from
pointing out the mote in the eye of Islam. If the current state of Western
culture, sometimes in leading aspects referred to by the present Pope as
1. Mens rea is defined as "[a] guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal
intent. Guilty knowledge and wilfulness." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (5th ed.
1979).
2. David Ignatius, The Psyche of Bin Laden, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2001, at B7.
3. Tom Shales, Getting Serious on Saturday Night, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2001, at CI.
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"the culture of death,"4 is a natural outgrowth of Christianity, then
"beam" indeed is too small a concept for what Christendom has in its
5
eye.
And, yet, however credible each of these complaints by the terrorists is
a source of sorrow, moral indignation, political opposition, or legal
action, the terrorists have made no credible case that any is a redressable
wrong giving rise to a just cause of war. At the root of none can they
point to an act or omission of the will making the United States
responsible for material harms involuntarily suffered by identifiable
people. It is a sign of the fanaticism of America's enemies, of their
rejection of reason as the basis of human relations, that they believe they
are entitled to smite those with harm in retaliation for what they perceive
guilt, in an abstract sense, dissociated from the blameworthiness of
actions intended to harm identifiable people in concrete ways.
If the terrorists were to attempt to reformulate their claims in terms of
the distinction being discussed here, it would greatly reduce the
offensiveness of their position. Even then, however, their argument
would rely on complex and artificial characterizations of purposes and
effects making it doubtful at best. They would more appropriately
register it in a court of law or propose it as the basis of political
consensus.
Other grievances recited by the terrorists deserve much closer
consideration as a just cause of war against us. They allege, for example,
that we have intentionally inflicted, or at least, with malignant
indifference, through our neglect, have allowed, the children and infirm
of Iraq to die or suffer irreparable injury to their health through our
enforcement of our embargo against that country, that we have killed
and injured substantial numbers of Iraqi civilians in our Gulf War, and
that our military aid has, with our knowledge and tacit consent, done the
same to Palestinian civilians.6 Such harms have occurred, whether or not
4. "This reality is characterized by the emergence of a culture which denies
solidarity and in many cases takes the form of a veritable 'culture of Death."' Pope John
Paul II, Evangelium vitae 12 (1995).
5. "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not
the beam that is in thine own eye? Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the
mote out of thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast
out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out
of thy brother's eye." Matthew 7:3 (King James) (emphasis added).
6. A demographer at the U.S. Census Bureau drawing on unclassified estimates
places the death toll for civilians directly attributable to the Gulf War at 13,000, with
another 110,000 civilians dying in the aftermath of the war through civil unrest, disease,
and malnutrition. Roger Normand & Chris af Jochnick, The Legitimation of Violence: A
Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387, 398 (1994). The Iraqi Red
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to the extent alleged by the terrorists, and they are in fact prima facie
redressable wrongs whose redressability needs to be rebutted by a
showing of justification. Such justification would lie in our showing that
we accepted the occurrence of such injuries only with regret as the
indirect result of proportionate military redress for wrongs committed by
the state we or our allies have attacked. We have thus in fact offered
arguments that in such instances our actions were justified. If our
arguments in this regard persuade, then our opponents' attack on us of
September 11th was unjustified in all respects, the attack on the
Pentagon representing one of its worst features, an unjustified and
intentional infliction of a material harm on the United States in its
capacity as a sovereign state charged with defending its citizens' security.
But even if our past infliction of such material harms was unjustified,
the greater part of the September 11th attack was beyond the scope of
just redress. Father Schall introduces his second pivotal distinction, at
this point. This principle makes some direct and intentional harms
intrinsically wrong and never justifiable under any circumstances, even to
redress past injuries. His distinction is this: those guilty of redressable
wrongs may be directly attacked in redress of their offenses only because
they are guilty; material harm may never be intentionally and directly
inflicted on innocent people for any reason. The distinction originates in
the concept of the human person as an end in him or herself who may
never be used as a means. The attack on the World Trade Center was an
intrinsically evil act which remains unjustified, regardless of its
perpetrators' redressable grievances, and its scale would seem to ensure
that it is, itself, independently a redressable harm. The failure of
America's opponents to have insight into this point is another hallmark
of their fanaticism, intensifying the moral necessity of military redress
against them.
In contrast to the grievances recited by the terrorists, the harms
suffered by America are clearly blameworthy because they originated
with acts of will directing material harm at identifiable people without
their consent and without justification. The World Trade Center attack
Crescent Society estimates the death toll from the eleven-year embargo which the United
States has led against Iraq at 1.6 million and attributes thousands of civilian deaths to the
continuing U.S. air bombardments of Iraq as well. Iraqi Red Crescent Expresses
"Sympathy" with Victims of 1] September Events, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Oct.
30, 2001. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society estimates the number of Palestinians
killed in the West Bank and Gaza at 908 since September 29, 2000, with 17,032 injured.
See Palestinian Red Crescent Society Web Site, at http://www.palestinercs.org/ (last visited
Jan. 8, 2002).
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sought to take the lives of the innocent.7 Victims included not only those
directly killed or injured, but also millions of others whose economic well
being was indirectly harmed in a substantial way by the damage done.8
In the case of the attack on the Pentagon, the terrorists did not clearly
state a claim to act in redress of specific past wrongs, as opposed to for
the sake of terror, and even if they had, we have asserted that our own
previous actions were justified and thus not redressable by attacking the
Pentagon. In addition to the tangible harms of death and economic loss,
the terrorists sought beyond any conceivable just redress, through terror,
to injure the United States' capacity to care for the basic needs of its
people and to reason fairly and effectively about its future. These are
also very serious redressable wrongs.
The wrong perpetrated by the terrorists is more blameworthy for its
flouting of the inviolability of innocent life; the malice of its intending to
destroy America's capacity to reason and to care for those dependent
upon it; and, as it was, its sheer scale aggravated by accompanying threats
of further harm. Their unwillingness or inability to embrace basic
principles of moral accountability both explains their failure to present a
cogent case for the redressability of America's alleged past wrongs and
the gravity of the redressable offenses they have now committed against
America. Not only is the harm they have done redressable, it is so
extreme that legal or political means of redress might well be per se
insufficient to redress it, making a military response not only licit, but
morally necessary.
B. Public Authority
Human beings align themselves in diverse kinds of groups according to
various common purposes, values, and interests. These various groups
come into conflict with one another. But, according to Father Schall's
principle of public authority, only a state, organized under a public
authority, can redress wrongs through the use of military force.
America's conflict with its terrorist opponents can be understood as
7. As of January 2, 2002, the number of deaths caused by the attack on the World
Trade Center is cited as 2,936. See Trade Center Death Toll now 2,936, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/03/rec.wtc.toll/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002).
8. New York City lost 44,200 jobs during the month of October 2001, attributable to
the World Trade Center attack, and an another 50,000 jobs in New York City are
considered to be at risk due to the economic impact of the attack through mid-2002. Amy
Cortese, New York, Badly Battered but Stronger Than in the 1970's, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
200t, at C4. The total economic cost of the September 11th attack is estimated by the
International Monetary Fund at $21 Billion. IMF Estimates U.S. Cost of Terror Attacks at
$21 Billion, Predicts Recovery in 2002, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2001, at A2.
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running between groups or associations at diverse levels. It can be seen
as a conflict between certain adherents of Islam and certain adherents of
Western secularism, global and regional commercial interests, or
believers and nonbelievers. But, resort to military redress may not be
licitly considered at the level of grievances experienced at any of these
levels of disagreement. It becomes a moral option only at the level of
social organization under a public authority.
Father Schall's principle assumes that authority arises when society
organizes itself to ensure its preservation and to guarantee the basic
requisites of living for its members. The function of the authority
includes the establishment of an order of justice, both among the
society's members and between the society and those who would attack it
from without. Because public authority arises from the social nature of
man, and is autonomous of any kind of delegation by religious or other
privileged perspective, it extends both to the finality of judgment and its
execution. Conscientious critics may offer valid objections, but the
state's authority does not depend on their approval.
America's terrorist enemies do not appear willing or capable of
reasoning or acting according to this concept. They assume that the
authority of the state derives from its serving the purposes of a religious
movement. Their imperviousness to the distinction between public
authority and religious conviction heightens the importance of the public
authority which they attack vindicating itself. Insight into the principle
of public authority is not to be taken for granted in any quarter.
Historically, this principle has been contested by religious believers in
many different religions, including Western Christianity.9 At present, it
is under pressure both from the side of resurgent tribalism and supra-
national economic relationships. In seeking redress for the wrongs of
September 11th, the public authority of the United States is defending
not just the concrete good of its people, but the very concept of public
authority as a principle of societal order.
However, it will be noted that in the steps leading up to its resort to a
military response, the United States specifically chose to reject the claims
of the Taliban regime as the public authority functioning within
9. The relation of civil and religious authority has a complex history in Christian
Europe, but the turning point in which the autonomy of civil authority is recognized, as it
now is, for example, in the first amendment of the United States Constitution, is probably
the Peace of Wesphalia of 1648, concluding the Thirty Years War, a war of religion.
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 3733 (1979). The treaty is known for the
principle cuius regio eius religio, which may be loosely translated as "state decision dictates
the religion to be established." Id.
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Afghanistan. It refused to honor the assertions of due process set forth
by that government and eventually declared it to be illegitimate and
overthrew it.'0 The United States did so without contradicting its respect
for the principle of public authority, since no claim to hold public
authority is absolute, but can be invalidated by offenses against the very
order of justice it exists to uphold. The offenses against justice that are
alleged might be against persons external to the society over which the
public authority presides, as was the case with the Taliban's support for
international terrorism."
And, the question then is fairly asked of whether any injustices
committed by the United States deprive it of its status as public
authority. Even if the United States' record with respect to direct
injustices against persons external to American society appears to be
comparably good in relation to that of other states (one may here
bracket what one thinks of the indirect harms caused by the
advancement of American interests - since these are not redressable
harms in the sense described above), with respect to the moral rights of
persons within its jurisdiction, one may think of substantial historic
abuses such as the enslavement of African Americans or the
displacement or even genocide of Native Americans. Or, one may
instead consider the alleged contemporary abuses, such as the promotion
of abortion, which led serious thinkers in a mainstream journal to
question whether the United States had, in fact, lost its status of public
authority."
There is no bright line test for determining whether the injustice
10. The Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan stated that his government required proof
that bin Laden was involved in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
before it would consider extraditing him. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Taliban Vows
"Showdown of Might" With United States; Afghan Regime Asks for Evidence Against Bin
Laden, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2001, at A3.
11. European diplomats who heard the United States' briefing of NATO on its case
for military action stated that they had been "provided an array of evidence that would be
enough to indict bin Laden, his al Qaeda network and the Taliban in complicity to commit
terrorism." William Drozdiak & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. Evidence on Bin Laden
"Compelling"; Allies Give Unconditional Support for Retaliatory Strikes; Taliban Official
Asks to See Proof, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2001, at All. Subsequent evidence emerging
after the collapse of the Taliban government is confirmatory. It appears that the Taliban
government accepted direct financial and material assistance from bin Laden. Peter
Baker, Defector Says Bin Laden Had Cash, Taliban In His Pocket, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,
2001, at Al.
12. "The question here explored, in full awareness of its far-reaching consequences, is
whether we have reached or are reaching the point where conscientious citizens can no
longer give moral assent to the existing regime." The End of Democracy? The Judicial
Usurpation of Politics, 67 FIRSTTHINGS 18 (1996).
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perpetrated by a state deprives it of its status as a public authority. The
question is not one which generally is, or can be, adjudicated by a court,
even a competent international tribunal. It is one, rather, to be decided
in raw contests of who can garner the power necessary to coordinate the
interests of the society. Paradoxically, the assessment of assertions of the
illegitimacy of a regime, in principle, cannot be separated from the real
politik of whether the critic, in fact, has the power to substitute a new
regime for the one whose legitimacy he or she questions. The value of
stability in human social organization entails a presumption in favor of
the arguments of whomever has the power to coordinate the life of
society as a going concern. Because America appears to have the power
to broker the creation of a substitute regime by the people of
Afghanistan, its critique of the justice of the Taliban regime, therefore,
will be taken to be presumptively valid. The test then becomes
effectively whether the usurper of the old regime displays a will,
prospectively, to permit the formation of a new public authority in the
society which has been overtaken. The same is true of every revolution
which succeeds.
The U.S. government's status as public authority with the function of
redressing redressable wrongs by military means is to be presumed based
on its effectiveness in coordinating the fulfillment of the basic needs of
American society. If the U.S. government were not so recognized, then
by what alternative means would American society preserve the order of
justice which properly unites it?
Even if one were to succeed in establishing serious injustices on the
part of the government, one would not necessarily be entitled to
challenge its authority in principle, as opposed to resist injustices actually
established, or perhaps ignore the government's elective undertakings.
One would presumptively not be justified in denying the authority of the
government to undertake its essential and basic functions. Defending
society against an intentional, direct, and malicious assault on the most
fundamental conditions of its security, as seen in the attacks of
September 11th, would be such an essential and basic function.
Governments can be quite corrupt without sacrificing their interim
authority to advance this most basic interest. The government of Joseph
Stalin appears to have been thoroughly vicious, and yet it seems fair to
say that it did not lose its authority to defend the peoples of the Soviet
Union from the unjust military invasion of Hitler's Germany. If Stalin's
government never sacrificed this authority, then the government of the
United States certainly has not.
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C. Proportionality of Response
The just cause of redressable injury and the redress being sought by
public authority ensures jus ad bellum. But, just how that authority seeks
its redress is also subject to assessment for jus in bello. The further
distinctions to be observed flow from the principle of proportionality.
The harm inflicted must be proportionate to the wrong redressed.
Redress can be conceived of in terms either of retribution or deterrence.
Proportionality covers the amount of harm which may be directed
against the enemy. The harm inflicted must be proportionate to the
injustice redressed. If the conception is one of deterrence, it must be
proportionate to what is required to prevent a recurrence. The precision
of America's advanced technology of warfare ensures that America has
proceeded in its defense with an exquisite proportionality that could only
have been marveled at in earlier military campaigns that dragged on for
years over vast terrain.
But, there is a second aspect of proportionality. The harm inflicted
must be distributed in proportion to guilt: as was mentioned above, it
may only be inflicted directly on those who are guilty. This is true under
the principle of discrimination, which may be understood as a corollary
of the principle of proportionality. It was this principle which America's
terrorist enemies so egregiously violated by flying planes of innocent
passengers into buildings filled with innocent office workers, thereby
greatly heightening the blameworthiness of their attack on the United
States. America has attempted to be, and all evidence so far indicates
has succeeded in being, exquisitely discriminatory in this positive sense.
In the context of America's present dispute with terrorism, the true
challenge to prudence posed by the principle of proportionality is, yet
again, different and it could easily be overlooked. The perpetrators of
the wrongs of September l1th were not themselves the representatives of
a sovereign state. They were rather individuals aligned with a movement
of cultural and religious reform. As individuals, they would ordinarily be
entitled to the due process of law. Thus, the Taliban asked for proof of
Osama bin Laden's guilt before they would agree to his extradition by
the United States. On the face of it, they were observing the appropriate
form which is a prerequisite to the coercion of an individual. To directly
attack an individual to remedy redressable wrongs without notice or
hearing would ordinarily be itself a serious violation of the due process of
law. The violation would be twofold. It would be to disregard the public
authority charged with maintaining the order of justice under the rule of
law within the individual's society. And, it would be to deprive the
individual affected of the respect owed every person until ther is a legal
[Vol. 51:35
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adjudication of his guilt. For these reasons, targeted killings, whether of
Fidel Castro, as reportedly once pursued by the CIA,'3 or more recently
undertaken by Israel against Palestinian leaders,'4 are presumptively
illicit.
The nature of terrorism, however, ensures that the problem will
endure. The public authority of the society attacked must vindicate the
rights and interests of its citizens against assailants who are themselves
individuals, rather than representatives of any state. One principled
construal of the situation would allege that the public authority with
jurisdiction over the terrorist is ineffective and substitute its own
authority in a policing action. Such a construal would require the public
authority seeking redress to exercise a number of key judgments of
prudence. These judgments would be far trickier than judgments about
the degree of physical risk to noncombatants that is compatible with the
principle of nondiscrimination in conventional scenarios, because they
are judgments about attaching legal characterizations to situations, i.e.
that the local public authority is to be deemed "nonfunctioning." A
government's failure to make these difficult judgments could well result
in its being fairly charged with an intrinsically unjust direct attack on the
innocent.
Moreover, individuals in the territory subject to military redress would,
in keeping with the legal characterization justifying intervention, be
entitled to the protections at least of the norms of probable cause and
imminent danger of serious bodily harm to others restricting the use of
lethal force by the police. The intervening state would also be required
to discriminate adequately in distributing the indirect costs of its action
on residents of the country who are not suspected terrorists. The country
seeking redress would necessarily impose many indirect costs on the
residents of the country invaded without regard to their being suspected
terrorists. These costs would include fear, loss of property, and
disruption of common life. They would be imposed by the intervening
country without any specific comprehensive authority to make the many
calculations of the common good of the country invaded appropriate to
the distribution of such costs. The harms would be suffered through both
13. A congressional investigation undertaken in 1975 determined that poisoned
cigars, exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit had been tested by the CIA for
use in assassinating Fidel Castro. George Lardner, Target Castro, WASH. POST, June 7,
1999, at C13.
14. For example, the Israeli assassination of Abdel Rahman Hamad who was
suspected in a Tel Aviv discoteque bombing which left twenty-two dead. Steven Mufson,
U.S. Denounces Targeted Killing; Israel Rebuked for Assassinating Palestinian Suspect,
WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at A18.
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the concrete effect of the invasion and the intangible harm to the society
of the invaded country of disregarding the authority of its political
representatives. The principal of proportionality demands also that both
of these kinds of harm be justified. They would be justified by the
comparatively greater harm suffered in the injury being redressed.
According to an alternative construal, the country seeking redress
could charge the public authority in the society in which terrorists reside
as itself guilty of the independent redressable offense of complicity in the
terrorist action. In this construal, the invading country would be
charging the local regime not with guilt for the terrorist attack, but with a
blameworthy act or omission of the will in somehow aiding, permitting,
or tolerating the commission of such acts by others. A judgment of
prudence would be required as to when the ineffectiveness of the local
government in policing its own country or when its indirect support of
the terrorists became blameworthy. The assessment of blameworthiness
now would regard actions and attitudes difficult to separate from the
multifarious prudential judgments that every sovereign state must make,
and which each regime will necessarily make according to its own
competing set of interests.
In this second construal, which the United States has in fact pursued,
there is danger of substituting a legal fiction of guilt for true moral
responsibility on the part of those who are being retaliated against.
There is the danger of incurring the redressable wrong of an unjustified
attack on another society's public authority. Acting without sufficient
prudence would place America in a posture difficult to distinguish from
that of the very terrorists it is combating. In the present conflict, the U.S.
government has taken care to create a case for the proportionality of its
overriding the public authority of the Taliban regime. It appears to have
insisted on reliable intelligence of Taliban complicity in the September
11th bombings, 5 and it has worked promptly and effectively to restore an
autonomous regime in Afghanistan capable of serving as that society's
independent public authority. 6 In addition, it has struggled to minimize,
and even reverse, harm to the separate, comprehensive common good of
the region, by providing it with massive humanitarian aid.
15. See supra note 11.
16. Hamid Karzai was sworn in as chairman of an new interim government in
Afghanistan by mid-December 2001. David Rohde, A Nation Challenged; Transfer of
Power; Afghan Leader is Sworn In, Asking for Help to Rebuild, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001,
at IA.
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II. THE ONTOLOGICAL CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO ASCERTAIN THE
JUSTICE OF REDRESS
By situating reasoning about the justice of military redress within the
broader context of practical reason or prudence, Father Schall, on the
one hand, places it within an open-ended context, in which plans of
action must be formulated with uncertainty about both practical outcome
and the ultimate correctness even of one's judgments about justice. On
the other hand, he places it in the context of objective values knowable in
relation to the agent's last end. This second assertion calls for an
exploration of the ontological conditions which are objectively necessary
for a nation to act rightly in seeking military redress. All three principles
of justice considered so far, just cause, public authority, and
proportionality of response are grounded ontologically, and the
distinctions flowing from each can be applied concretely only in
reference to considerations of ontology.
Father Schall does not dwell upon these questions of ontology, but
they are, nonetheless, essential to the integrity of the mode of reasoning
Father Schall advances. The teleology they offer provides a basis for
dialogue with all those who lack the insight into the truth of the
principles enumerated above, including the perpetrators of terrorism
against America. Three considerations of ontology present themselves in
this context. These are: (1) God as the summum bonum; (2) subsidiary
forms of human association as essential to human fulfillment; and (3) the
comprehensive scope of the rule of law, as the basis of human social life.
A. God as the Summum Bonum
Both in its references to prudence and to justice, the mode of moral
reasoning that Father Schall employs assumes that a summum bonum
exists, which is the human person's true last end. That summum bonum
is God. All more particular goods derive their intelligibility from this
ultimate good. The obligations of justice are grounded in the objective
hierarchy of goods experienced in relation to God as the highest good.
Father Schall advances a mode of moral reasoning which is inherently
theistic.
This theistic reference can be passed by in silence even by believers in
many forms of moral discourse, for example in conversation with non-
theists who are persons of good will and who are attentive to the shared
intuitions of morally persuasive reasoning. But, in an age when
references to God are tolerated only as emotivism, and when the U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment as entailing a far-
reaching exclusion of God from public life, the question necessarily arises
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of whether the maintenance of an order of justice by the public authority
can itself be undertaken without reference to God. In point of fact,
America's opponents in its present conflict charge it with having lost its
legitimacy precisely through losing its sense of God as the source of all
moral order. If we were to mistake this objection for just another sign of
the fanaticism of our antagonists, we would be at risk for failing to honor
an essential element of moral reasoning with the consequence that we
would end up as "a nation in moral conflict with itself."
The autonomy of the political order and the finality of public
judgments of right and wrong, underived from any delegation by religion,
that were stressed above as implicit in the concept of public authority,
should not be mistaken for the exclusion of God from public reasoning
about right and wrong. To the contrary, and in a manner that could
appear paradoxical, the political order must properly acknowledge God
as the summum bonum in relation to which relationships of justice
ultimately assume their logic and proportion. This principle is clearly
recognized by the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, which
acknowledges in its Preamble that it is adopted, "in consciousness of its
accountability before God."' 7 It also underlies the U.S. Supreme Court's
continuing unwillingness to require the abolition of prayers opening
legislative sessions. 8  It is evident in the American Declaration of
Independence, a founding document of the United States.'9 It is seen as
well in St. Thomas Aquinas'20 and Plato's 2' common explanation of the
17. "Im BewuBtsein seiner Verantwortung vor Gott.... hat das Deutsche Volk ...
dieses Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublic Deutschland beschlossen .... GRUNDGESETZ
[Constitution] Preamble (F.R.G.). The statement is translated as "[i]n consciousness of its
accountability before God, the German People has resolved upon this Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany."
18. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983) (upholding Nebraska legislature's
practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the state).
19.
WHEN in the course of human Events, it becomes necessary for One People to
dissolve the Political Bands Which have connected them with another, and to
assume . . . the separate and equal State to which the laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them .... WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all
Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights ... "
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776).
20.
Wherefor Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, its first three
conditions; viz., that it foster religion, in asmuch as it is proportionate to divine
Law, that it be helpful to discipline, inasmuch as it is proportionate to natural
law; and that it further the common weal, inasmuch as it is proportionate to the
utility of mankind.
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 1-11, Q. 95, art. 3 (1981) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 51:35
The Morality of America's War Against Terrorism
law's role in grounding social order.
The earnest and often fanatical nature of our opponents should not
blind us to the truth of their criticism of our godlessness. The condition
to our appeal to the principles developed above in justifying our redress
against them is that we find a way to acknowledge, as a society, that our
public authority has its authority and that our principles of just cause and
proportionality have their testimony in relation to God. The
Administration's rhetoric as it entered the military phase of the conflict
was correct in the care it took to affirm this point.22 The balance which
we must strike is a subtle one, for it also includes respect for the
autonomy of politics from religion and for the First Amendment liberty
of the individual to believe or disbelieve as he or she likes.
B. Subsidiary Forms of Association as Essential to Human Fulfillment
The legitimacy of the public order is measured only in part by whether
it respects the freedom of the individual. It is also measured by whether
it respects subsidiary forms of human relationship. These center above
all on the family, but they also include a whole range of civic and cultural
associations. The legal enforcement of criminal and tort law, as well as
property rights and market transactions, is appropriately part of the
order of justice maintained by the public authority. But, a state that
protected only such rights and transactions would be unduly
individualistic. The legitimacy of the public order also hinges, in part, on
its protecting cultural assets, public morality, and family relationships.
The effect of one-sidedly equating law with the enforcement of market
transactions in the context of economic globalization can be to
undermine the stability of non-market relationships. One source of the
discontent of America's terrorist opponents is undoubtedly the negative
consequences for the stability of regional cultures of America's
domination of the global market. Another contributing factor is the
excessive individualism and the immodesty of the popular culture which
21.
And this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all sayings, -
that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods ... is the noblest and best of
all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and neat ....
But the legislator who . . . has gone through all . . . [these] preliminaries may
proceed to the work of legislation.
PLATO, THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 488-89 (B. Jowett, trans., 1937).
22. President George Bush's address to a joint session of Congress and the American
People on September 20, 2001, both called for the American people to pray and cited God
as the arbiter of justice. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People at the United States Capitol (Sept. 20, 2001).
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American entertainment industry takes around the world. The
monolithic vision of a restoration of Islam, particularly through its denial
of women's rights, is incompatible with what Western countries have
come to understand as required by an enlightened order of justice.
Nonetheless, the moral indignation which our culture arouses in our
opponents should be to us not just a sign of their fanaticism but an
occasion for acknowledging the due claims of subsidiary forms of family,
civic, and cultural associations. And where the order of justice properly
champions the rights of the individual as such, we should be prepared to
acknowledge that it properly does so within an order of virtue, according
to some credible concept of virtue.
At certain points, a credible order of justice subordinates individual
autonomy to other relational values. As we reject the monolithic
alternative of a restored Islamic order, it is essential to the integrity of
our own reasoning about justice and social order that we be open to
diverse cultural visions of how precisely the global market should exist in
interplay with other forms of association and how American
individualism can be rooted in a credible conception of public virtue as
the basis of social life.23
C. The Comprehensive Scope of the Rule of Law
In seeking military redress against its enemies, the United States aims
at restoring an order of justice. This order of justice is, at one and the
same time, the rule of law. At the very least, the order we seek to restore
accords with natural law, understood as what reason ordains regarding
right conduct. But, it is also an order under civil law, both domestic and
international. Father Schall rightly stipulates that the uprightness of our
intention in pursuing military redress depends on our willingness to
persuade our opponents. Such persuasion must ultimately aim at
obtaining their consent to a common rule of conduct, i.e., to compliance
with a rule of law.
To be just, the resort to military force may occur only after it has been
determined that adequate means of redress under law are unavailable.
As was noted above, the September 11th attack was of such a nature that
23. A genuine dialogue across cultures on such issues, as necessary as it is, can in
itself be quite difficult. Where cultural differences should be respected and where they
should be subordinated to common standards stands to be determined. For an example of
where the common standard would presumably apply, see the case of the Taliban's
destruction of artworks considered to give religious offense. Molly Moore, Taliban: Most
Statues Destroyed: Afghan Rulers Reject Criteria for Purging "Idols," WASH. POST, Mar. 4,
2001, at A22.
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any response less than one seeking military redress would have been per
se inadequate. However, even in a case such as this, the rightness of
America's intention in pursuing its action depends on its willingness to
submit to the legal resolution of the dispute if such a resolution were
available. One can say more than this. Immanuel Kant develops a
compelling case that the justice of any nation's resort to war depends on
its willingness to contribute to the gradual emergence of the legal means
of resolving international disputes making future wars unnecessary.24
The scope of the rule of law is, as Aquinas5 no less than Kant asserts,
always comprehensive, aiming at an order of universal happiness or
universal mutuality of respect.
War can be justified only where an international legal order has not yet
emerged adequate to the resolution of the dispute in question. The
establishment of such an order in the future is a dynamic requirement of
a right intention in pursuing war where no such order currently exists.
Parallel principles apply domestically, so that the relaxation of due
process guarantees for the sake of coping with a national emergency can
be justified only as the strictest necessity, and only with a commitment to
their full restoration at the first opportunity. By emphasizing that we
have witnessed an attack on "America's freedom,"26 the rhetoric of the
Administration falls short in this regard. The attack as an assault more
on "order" than "freedom." It was, specifically, an attack on the order of
an international community of nations committed to peace and justice.
America dismissed the Taliban request for proof of guilt as a condition of
extradition as a ruse and then attacked and overthrew the regime. The
American judgment in the matter would appear to have been justifiable,
but we should remember with sober regard that necessity required us to
fling the words of due process back in the faces of applicants, lest we
someday find ourselves corrupted into lawlessly championing our
"freedom" and "power" over the law which binds together the
international community in ties of peace and justice.
24. "After all, war is only a regrettable expedient for asserting one's rights by force
within a state of nature, when no court of justice is available to judge with legal authority."
IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT POLITICAL
WRITINGS 117 (H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991).
25. "The law must need regard properly the relationship to universal happiness."
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-l1, Q. 90, art. 2 (1981) (emphasis added).
26. President Bush characterized those responsible for the September l1th attack as
the "enemies of freedom" in his address to a joint session of Congress and the American
People on September 20, 2001. See Bush's Address, supra note 22.
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III. THE NATURE OF THE RENEWAL IN LAW AND POLITICS WHICH IS
REQUIRED TO PRESERVE THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS OF A JUST
AMERICAN RESPONSE BY FORCE OF ARMS
If America is to wage war against its opponents justly, it must be able
to show just cause, public authority, and proportionality of response. It
can show these only if its concept of public authority, and the reasons
which that authority offers to the world for its actions, are adequately
grounded by reference to a summum bonum, subsidiary associations and
relational values, transcending the individualism of the market, and
integration within a comprehensive international rule of law. Such a
tripartite ontological grounding calls for a renewal of the American soul
both within international relations and within the categories of American
law and political discourse.
Two basic themes emerge, then, as one considers the challenge of
September 11th for law and politics: the role of liberalism and the future
of sovereignty. The closer scrutiny of the just war principles proposed by
Father Schall suggests, for example, that when defended against the
spurious objections of America's adversaries, just war principles emerge
as inherently liberal. They require that public authority be grounded
with autonomy from religious authority, and they also require that
wrongs redressable by military force be restricted to acts or omissions
reflecting individual moral responsibility through the infliction of
material harm on identifiable individuals without their consent. These
two criteria of redressability define wrongs in individualist and liberal
terms, rather than in terms of organic social relationships.
So, to some degree, the challenge is to persuade participants in the
emerging global world order that it is destined to be a liberal order.
And, yet, at the same time, liberalism's role in defining this new order is
not unqualified. America is in need of, again, persuading itself that the
credibility of its campaign for redress depends on its own
acknowledgment of first principles now too often lost from sight. The
rule of law under public authority must be free of the entanglement of
religious authority, but it must still be seen as grounded in God as the
uncreated ground of all human authority. The justice of individual
claims must likewise be seen within a hierarchy of values that respects
society's subsidiary associations and relationships for their essential
contribution to human fulfillment.
A second key lesson of September 11th is the continuing importance of
sovereignty in preserving an order of justice in the world. There is
arguably no adequate, specifically legal, remedy for the attack which
America suffered, so that its response as a sovereign by military force
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became essential not only to its own welfare, but to the stability and
justice of world order. Just war reasoning reinforces the importance of
the concept of sovereignty through its deployment of the concept of
public authority. The ideological fanaticism of America's opponents, by
displaying willful disregard for the concept of sovereignty, has, in effect,
underscored anew its continuing importance.
At the same time, America's exercise of its sovereignty with the
rhetoric of "freedom" and "power" could be taken to imply wrongly that
sovereignty may be exercised without regard for the comprehensive and
universal scope of the rule of law. September 11th may show that
sovereignty has a future in the new world order, but the principles of
justice to which America refers to justify its military action also suggest
that sovereignty must simultaneously be transcended by integration into
an increasingly efficacious international legal regime.
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